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Wittgenstein and Haydn on Understanding Music
  Yael Kaduri 
Abstract
Wittgenstein's remarks about music have motivated philosophers to build a
comprehensive picture of his philosophy of music, concentrating on the central
issues of musical meaning. It is often claimed that, according to Wittgenstein,
understanding music consist in grasping the internal relationships between
musical events. Musical practice, however, is naturally saturated with what
philosophers often call extra-musical meanings. The present study, by
considering a musical issue in Haydn's instrumental music, attempts to show
that musical language games in the Wittgensteinian sense involve explanations
of music that enhance the listener's ability to understand music by broadening
his musical competence. Nevertheless, constituting understanding of music,
these explanations might use professional musical terms as well as non-musical
terms, comparisons, gestures and so on. Thus, though music does not goes
beyond itself in the sense of being understood through correlations between
purely musical "concepts" and extra-musical contents, it does go beyond itself
in musical practice, which involves understanding music through explanations
and descriptions of music using various kinds of terms and images.
Key Words
musical meaning, understanding music, philosophy of music, Wittgenstein,
Haydn, description of music, explanation of music, extra-musical description,
formal description of music, musical expressiveness, empirical investigation of
music, philosophical investigation of music
1. Introduction
The question of understanding music or musical meaning is one of the central
issues in philosophy of music.[1] From its very beginning, people thinking about
music have tried to explain its importance in human life, thus dealing, whether
explicitly or implicitly, with the question of meaning in music.
The issue is particularly challenging when instrumental music - absolute music,
as Wagner was the first to name it - is at issue: How could a collection of pure
musical sounds express anything? What does it mean to understand music that
does not contain words? These and accompanying questions are the heart of a
philosophical discourse which has gradually become broader over the years.
Philosophers as musicologists wonder again and again about the unobvious link
between instrumental music and the extra-musical world as a source of musical
meaning.
Naturally, a pure philosophical examination would be different from a
musicological one. Philosophers deal with questions of principle, and try to
weave a net of concepts and ideas. Musicologists, on the other hand, usually
concentrate on a specific musical piece or style. In many cases they use non-
musical models - theories of language understanding, narratologies, semiologies
and so on - to explain meaning in music.
In this essay I will offer an apparently indirect way of dealing with this issue - a
philosophical contemplation of musicological research. The study that will serve
here as a kind of raw material is my recently concluded research on the general
pause in the instrumental music of Joseph Haydn.[2] I will present some
central aspects of this research, and simultaneously ask philosophical questions
about it, using some basic concepts of Wittgenstein's philosophy.
2. Philosophical and Empirical Investigation
In his later philosophy of language, Wittgenstein distinguishes between
philosophical and empirical investigation. Empirical investigation enquires about
the casual links between a word and the way people react to it. For example, if
we ask a group of subjects to point at the appropriate colored rectangle when
they hear the word "red," we could come to some conclusions about the
empirical link between the word and the subjects' behavior.
Philosophical investigation, in contrast, enquires about the intrinsic, logical links
between concepts in their different uses and contexts. Members of each cultural
environment grasp the permanent links between objects and facts as
normative. To give as example, in Western cultures we roll out a red carpet for
an honored guest; we do not wear loud red clothes at a funeral; a bride is
dressed in white. Grasped as norms, these links constitute a meaning of these
objects, and thus they are analogical to grammatical links in a particular
language.
The different uses of a concept in a particular human activity and its normative
links with other concepts form its "grammar." It is the concept's uses which
constitute its meaning. Philosophical investigation thus has an explanatory
power which empirical enquiry lacks. By emphasizing the concept's grammar as
a source of its meaning, it clarifies the essence and conditions of language
understanding.[3]
The distinction between philosophical and empirical enquiry is important for
musicological research and philosophical questions about it. We can imagine an
empirical study of the general pause in Western music. For example, we can
play for a group of listeners some short musical fragments that include
distinctive general pauses, and ask them to write sentences that translate the
fragments into words. Comparing the results would show to what extent the
pauses capture the listeners' attention and in what terms were they are inclined
to describe it.
It is likely that we will find some similarities among the descriptions of the
pause, as well as among the descriptions in general. In this way the empirical
study would demonstrate the obvious: The general pause is as communicative
as the sonorous events around it. However, it would not explain the fact that
the general pause is grasped as an integral part of the musical flow even
though apparently it cuts it off. It would not explain how is it possible that the
pause - the very absence of sound - has meaning, just as it would not explain
how other events have meaning.
Philosophical inquiry, in contrast, concentrates on analyzing musical examples,
classifying, comparing and revealing the links between them. It also takes into
consideration the relevant musical theories and aesthetic background.[4] The
assumption at the basis of my research is that studying the way Haydn uses
the special method of the general pause, and taking the theoretical and
aesthetic context into consideration, should lead to a deep understanding of the
meaning of the pause in Haydn's work. But why choose Haydn specifically?
3. Haydn and the "Grammar" of the General Pause
The music of the Baroque era (seventeenth century to mid-eighteenth century)
made use of the special effect of silence in music. Music theory of the time
offered the composer a catalogue of rhetorical figures for increasing the
expressivity of musical works. Among its offerings is a set of silent figures, the
most significant of which is the aposiopesis - the general pause. The general
pause of the Baroque was used to illustrate concepts such as eternity, death,
sublime, infinity and silence in vocal music.[5]
This concept did not disappear in the transition to the classic era, just as the
general idea of the rhetorical power of music did not. We can find examples of
the aposiopesis in the music of Haydn and Mozart, even in instrumental works.
A particularly remarkable example is found in the opening measures of Mozart's
Die Zauberflote: The whole symbolic content of the opera is embodied in the
ternary declarative chords and the unmeasured pauses (through fermatas)
between them. This dramatic opening involves the central masonic idea of
silence as a source of wisdom and patience. Romantic music could also serve as
a rich source of examples of representative musical silences of this kind.
However, Haydn represents a turning point. From the very beginning of my
research, two important facts became clear, especially when I compared Haydn
with his contemporary, Mozart. First, Haydn's instrumental music contains so
many general pauses that it seems they form an intrinsic component of his
musical language. Second, the pauses can be clearly classified into several
categories, which are dependent on genre, style and form. These two facts,
together with the immensity of Haydn's repertoire, seems to invite the analyst
to enquire into Haydn's systematic use of silence.
What then did the philosophical investigation of the general pause in Haydn's
music reveal? The study confirmed the hypothesis that almost every one of
Haydn's pauses belongs to one of the categories that were noticed in its
relatively early stage. The string quartets contain similar types of general
pauses, which are different from those found in the symphonies; movements in
sonata form contain general pauses that are different from those occurring in
rondo movements and minuets. Moreover, the pauses almost always appear in
the same positions in each of the different forms.
Four main categories can be noted. To make the issue clearer, I will briefly
mention two of them here. In the first movements of string quartets, which are
usually written in sonata form, Haydn uses the general pause as a part of his
compositional games to emphasize the compositional craft. The pauses seem
like dead ends and are crucially important in creating an impression of deviation
from the right way or compositional stumbles. Thus they create a quality of
romantic irony.
General pauses of another kind are frequent in Haydn's symphonies. In rondo
finale movements there are pauses juxtaposed to the successive repetition of a
small motif. The general pause is usually located before and after the repeated
motif, so that it seems that this motif enters the silence, as if to expand it with
notes. In contrast with the complicated general pauses of the string quartet, a
naive listener can grasp these symphonic pauses quite easily. The distinctions
by genres and forms are not surprising. The sonata form is the most
complicated of the classical forms, especially in the intimate and subtle context
of the string quartet. Thus, it is not surprising that general pauses of romantic
irony are included in these movements.
Final symphonic movements are in a way opposite to first movements in
chamber music. Since they bring the public symphonic event to a conclusion,
these movements have to be fairly simple yet still final evidence of the
composer's skill. Haydn therefore chose the trivial event of the articulating
pause, and expanded it by the successive repetition of a small element. In that
way he inserted a theatrical event that focuses the audience's attention on the
strategic articulating point.
The different ways in which Haydn employs the general pause and the logical
links between them constitute a "grammar" of the general pause, which provide
its meaning. My research shows that Haydn's instrumental music is an ideal
environment, a kind of a laboratory for this unique method. This environment,
which can be described in analytical, aesthetic and historical terms, is the
earliest conceptual field in Western music in which the general pause was
systematically cultivated, and thus provided with meaning.
4. Understanding Music as a Model for Understanding Language
Do we have to know all this in order to understand Haydn's general pause?
Does anything of all this comes into the listener's mind while listening to the
music? And what about the naive listener? It seems obvious that people
understand music when they listen to it, says Wittgenstein. However,
understanding music is not a mental event that occurs in the listener's mind as
a reaction to musical sounds. We therefore cannot understand what it means to
understand music through psychological or statistical studies of mental
reactions.
In his lectures on aesthetics, Wittgenstein explicitly discusses this point. We
cannot answer questions about aesthetic impressions through empirical
experiments or statistics as to people's reactions and the agreements among
them, he says.[6] Rather, to describe a musical taste we have to ask about the
whole musical tradition: Did children give concerts in that musical culture? Did
women give them or only men? Did widening the audience circle from the
nobility to the bourgeois have any influence on these matters? This is an
example of tradition in music, he concludes.[7]
Wittgenstein is talking about musical taste, but we can apply his idea to musical
styles or a unique musical phenomenon as well. Thus, it is important to have
some theoretical and aesthetic knowledge about the different forms in which
the general pauses usually occur. It is important to know the intended audience
of the work, as well as who was supposed to play it and where. It is important
to know who Haydn was compared to in his own day. The more we know, the
better we can understand Haydn's general pauses. In this way we can also
understand what is it to understand a musical pause. The last point paves the
way for an explanation of musical understanding, as we shall see.
Wittgenstein, who had a deep interest in music, discusses it on many occasions
throughout his writings.[8] His remarks about music have motivated
philosophers to build a comprehensive picture of his philosophy of music.[9]
Wittgenstein, who had a deep interest in music, discusses it on many occasions
throughout his writings.[8] His remarks about music have motivated
philosophers to build a comprehensive picture of his philosophy of music.[9]
Wittgenstein's intention, however, is not a purely aesthetic one; his lectures on
aesthetics include an exceptional example of discussing music for its own sake,
which means not as part of an explanation of meaning in language.[10] One of
Wittgenstein's principal methods of presenting his philosophy of language is
comparing sentence understanding with other human practices like
understanding a rule, obeying a signpost or understanding a facial expression.
Music is mentioned among these practices.
The picture of meaning that Wittgenstein is trying to undermine, to put it
briefly, is the traditional picture of understanding language as a mental
experience. According to that picture, concepts are like cards which we hold in
our mind and which refer to objects around us. For example, the card "red"
refers to the color red. Meaning is not constituted of correlations between
mental images and the world, says Wittgenstein. The picture in which
understanding a sentence is knowing what it refers to in the extra-linguistic
world is mistaken. Rather, it is linguistic practice, which is deeply rooted in the
human form of life, that constitutes meaning.
In the Brown Book Wittgenstein mobilizes music to clarify this idea:
What we call "understanding a sentence" has, in many cases, a
much greater similarity to understanding a musical theme than we
might be inclined to think. But I don't mean that understanding a
musical theme is more like the picture which one tends to make
oneself of understanding a sentence; but rather that this picture is
wrong, and that understanding a sentence is much more like what
really happens when we understand a tune than at first sight
appears. For understanding a sentence, we say, points to a reality
outside the sentence. Whereas one might say "Understanding a
sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the
sentence is in the sentence."[11]
Wittgenstein uses understanding music as a model for understanding language.
Understanding what it means to understand music can give us a clue to
understanding language. But the model, we would insist, is even more
enigmatic than the practice it comes to explain. Musicologists and philosophers
of music try to explain the meaning of absolute music by appealing to linguistic
meaning.
Displaying his awareness of this tendency, Wittgenstein states: "But I don't
mean that understanding a musical theme is more like the picture which one
tends to make oneself of understanding a sentence," the referential picture. If
so, it seems obvious why Wittgenstein uses understanding music as a model.
Instrumental music, in principle, is not referential, a fact that usually leads
people to raise the question of meaning in music. Precisely because musical
meaning can't be the result of an outside reference, it has the power to clarify
linguistic meaning. Musical meaning is constituted in the internal links between
"concepts" - musical events - and the purely musical games played with them.
The same is true of linguistic meaning.
It therefore seems that we have a formalistic picture of musical meaning here.
There is no place for talk about extra-musical meanings in instrumental music.
If "the content of the sentence is in the sentence" in language, it is certainly the
case in music. And even more than that, it is easier for us to understand this
notion in relation to music, especially instrumental music, than in relation to
language. That seems to be the reason why Wittgenstein makes use of the
concept of understanding a musical theme.[12] However, in Zettel Wittgenstein
says things that are apparently the opposite: "Doesn't the [musical] theme
point to anything outside itself? Yes, it does!"[13] Do we really have a
contradiction here?[14]
5. The Transition of Baroque Musical Theory
At this point we should return to the study of the general pause in Haydn's
music. We said that Haydn's general pause constitutes a turning point from the
Baroque pause. The aposiopesis, like other expressive rhetorical figures,
acquires its meaning through its correlations with extra-musical contents. We
can say that the meaning of the general pause in Baroque music is part of a
concept in which musical meaning is the result of referential power.
Haydn's general pause, in contrast, operates completely differently. Here the
pause does not get its meaning through links to the extra-musical world, but
through the rules of the musical game, the internal rules of instrumental music.
In the sonata-form first movements of the string quartet, as we said, the
general pauses are a part of an ironic emphasis on the compositional process
itself. In symphonic final movements, on the other hand, the lighter general
pauses are usually juxtaposed to a repetition of a small motif, to create a touch
of amusement.
Is it plausible to describe the transition from Baroque musical theory to that of
the classical style in these terms? This idea is not completely groundless. The
"meaning tables" offered by Baroque theory - the theory of musical figures -
are part of the concept of musical meaning of the time. While we cannot fully
understand Baroque music without an acquaintance with theories of figures, the
intelligibility of the classical style does not depend on rhetorical figures, which
became less important in the second half of the eighteenth century, even
though they did not completely disappear.[15]
The intelligibility of Haydn's general pause is thus not the result of extra-
musical meanings being correlated to it through rhetorical figures. However, it
is clear that this type of pause is not purely musical in the conventional sense.
The terms we have just used - dead ends, romantic irony, comic drama and so
on - indicate this. Now I would like to discuss a short musical fragment as an
illustration.
In the first movement of Haydn's string quartet in G minor, Op. 20, No. 3,
there is a short dramatic section in which Haydn cuts off the musical continuity
twice with general pauses (see example 1, below):
Example 1
After each of these pauses, Haydn inserts a brief assertive
motif that also interrupts the flow (the unisons of mm.
146-147 and m. 152). He then continues from the point
where he cut off the music before the pause. In that way,
the impression is created of repeated disruptions in the
course of a movement.
This section is exceptional and calls for an explanation. It is taken from a
movement in sonata form. The sonata form has two parts. The first part begins
with an exposition of a first theme in the movement key - the tonic. After that,
a transitional section leads to a second theme in a polar key. The second part
develops materials from the first part, modulating from one key to another. At
the end of the second part, a short but important section appears - the
retransition - which leads back to the tonic, the gravitational center of the
movement.
Example 2, below, shows the first theme of the movement and the transition to
the polar key:
Example 2
<="" p="">
What happens in the retransition of the first movement of Op. 20, No. 3? It
seems as if Haydn "walks" the sequence like a clown walking a tightrope in
imitation of an acrobat. He pretends to have a fear of heights; he seems to be
falling, but finally succeeds in completing the task, and the retransition leads
back to the tonic.
6. Wittgenstein on the Mental Processes of Understanding Music
Now, after the explanation, we might understand this exceptional passage.
Wittgenstein links explanations of music with understanding music:
Understanding and explaining a musical phrase. -Sometimes the
simplest explanation is a gesture; on another occasion it might be
a dance step, or words describing a dance. - But isn't
understanding the phrase experiencing something whilst we hear
it? . . . Are we supposed to imagine the dance, or whatever it may
be, while we listen? . . . If seeing the dance is what is important,
it would be better to perform that rather than the music. But that
is all misunderstanding.[16]
Explanations of music, according to Wittgenstein, do not rely on decisive
evidence, on justifying conditions. We can whistle, draw something, do some
movement with our hand or make a comparison with a clown walking a
tightrope and almost falling, for example. If we don't succeed in explaining it in
one way, we can always try another.
Such a concept of understanding music might cause dissatisfaction. Isn't
understanding music a mental process taking place in our mind when we listen
to music? This assumption, which is regarded almost as self-evident, is the
starting point for all the attempts to explain the nature of the musical
experience through psychological research. Whatever the mental process - a
construction of formal structures, a correlation between emotional labels and
musical motifs, electrical impulses in the brain and so on - these studies try to
investigate and quantify it. Theories attempting to provide explanations of
musical meaning through some sort of analogy between musical forms and
emotional forms are also based on the same assumption.
In any case, even if understanding music is indeed a mental process, we can
nevertheless ask how an explanation involving a gesture or an image is related
to it. Do they come to the listener's mind?
Wittgenstein, as usual, puts these questions in the mouth of his opponent. He
even adds a question of his own: "If seeing the dance is what is important, it
would be better to perform that rather than the music." And he concludes: "But
that is all misunderstanding."
Asking questions on a number of levels simultaneously is a central method in
Wittgenstein's writings. In some cases the questions call for an answer, and
here too we can try to answer them. But the way Wittgenstein concludes the
discussion indicates another direction. It is an expression of despair; he is no
longer able to bear the common but wrong picture that leads to the same
questions again and again. This picture always leads us into a trap. Though it
seems natural, moving the issue of understanding music into the mental solves
nothing. Either we are left with the enigma of musical intentionality ("Are we
supposed to imagine the dance while we listen?") or we lose the music ("If
seeing the dance is what is important, it would be better to perform that rather
than the music.") Thus, as long as we start with a mental process we will end
up at a dead end.
In music, such a dead end is presented particularly clearly. On the one hand,
pure formalism, which claims that musical forms are constructed in the
listener's mind while listening to the music, lacks the power to explain the
importance of music to human life - the excitement evoked by a particularly
marvelous performance, for example. The assumption that meaning in music is
the result of internal musical contents alone is analogous to the assumption
that language is not connected to the world. With formalism, then, we lose
music.
On the other hand, explanations that rightfully insist on associating musical
meaning with music's tremendous significance to human life do not manage to
avoid the picture of an unbridgeable gap between music and its emotional
meanings. As we said, psychological explanations are a search for agreements
between listeners' emotive descriptions of music, while theoretical explanations
involve analogies of one kind or another. Scholars in both camps wonder about
the magic of the linkage between sound and sentiment. And again, moving the
magic into the mental by no means makes it easier to understand. In the end,
we are left with the same gap between music and its emotional meanings that
motivated these explanations from the outset.
Thus, this is not the right way to approach the question of musical meaning.
What is the right way, then? We have to know music. We have to learn to play
an instrument, learn harmony, forms and structures; we have to know the
history of music, the history of its theory and aesthetics. We cannot explain or
understand how we understand music without knowing music, as we cannot
explain or understand how we understand language without knowing a
language. We cannot really talk about understanding music without some
degree of musical ability.
7. Language Games in Music
Musical activity is a "language game," a normative human practice which
language is a part of. In music, as in language, there are different types of
language games. Pianists understand and talk about piano music in a different
way than violinists; pianists and violinists talk about chamber music in a
different way from musicologists; and all of them talk about music differently
from amateurs. It is these different types of language games which constitute
musical meaning - itself of different types. The more comprehensive one's
musical skills, the deeper one's understanding. It is always possible to deepen it
even more by practice.
Observing musical practice shows that a constitutive component of it is the
explanation that tries to create understanding. This is what I have tried to show
in discussing the example of Haydn's string quartet. Descriptions of past
musical "language games" such as Haydn's are part of our own musical
language game. The more the contemporary listener knows about the sonata
form, its strategic junctions and the different ways Haydn manipulates it, as
well as the string quartet and the symphony as understood by eighteenth-
century aesthetic theory and the like, the better one understands Haydn's
string quartets.
Another language game that we can imagine is a music lesson: the teacher
explains a musical phrase to the student through an image or gesture. From the
student's reaction - a light in his eyes, something he says and especially the
way he now plays - the teacher can know whether he understood or not. If not,
the teacher can try another explanation. Understanding music, according to
Wittgenstein, is a matter of learning; that is what explanations in music are
aimed at.[17]
Observing musical practice shows us another thing: the transition from a
description in purely musical terms to a description in extra-musical terms does
not create any difficulties. On the contrary, it is the act of combining them that
creates explanations in music, even when we are discussing absolute music, as
in the quartet example.
All this leads us back to the apparent contradiction in Wittgenstein's remarks.
On the one hand, the musical theme asserts itself, but on the other, the theme
extends outside itself. In one paragraph of Culture and Value where
Wittgenstein talks about music, these apparently polar attitudes coexist:
"The repeat is necessary." In what respect is it necessary? . . . -
Don't we have an impression that a model for this theme already
exists in reality and the theme only approaches it, corresponds to
it, if this section is repeated? . . . Yet there just is no paradigm
apart from the theme itself. And yet again there is a paradigm
apart from the theme: namely, the rhythm of our language, of our
thinking and feeling. And the theme, moreover, is a new part of
our language; it becomes incorporated into it; we learn a new
gesture.[18]
These are among the deepest things that Wittgenstein says about music. Here
he is discussing the feeling of normativity that music evokes - in this case
through repetition. This feeling serves here as an example of an aesthetic,
intra-musical impression that calls for an explanation.[19]
8. Conclusion
We tend to say that one should not try to explain such a phenomenon on the
basis of extra-musical notions. The content of the musical sentence, including
what makes the repetition necessary, is in the sentence. However, the process
of explaining naturally takes us out of the music and into the world. The
necessity of the transition from one musical idea to another, says Wittgenstein
in another place in Culture and Value (and he is probably talking about
contrasting musical ideas), could be explained, for example, by a comparison
with the transition that takes place when a new character enters into a story -
"This is how the piece fits into the world of our thoughts and feelings."[20]
Human life is a collection of language games. It is these language games that
constitute language meaning. Music, being part of human activity - part of "the
rhythm of our language, of our thinking and feeling" - is from the outset
saturated with human concepts that are apparently extra-musical - emotive
concepts, grammatical terms and so on. We could not imagine musical activity
that is disconnected from a language. When we come to understand music - to
learn how to play, to learn the history and theory of music - we immediately
understand that.
If so, it is not a mental operation that correlates sound with sentiment. Rather,
it is in the musical language game that "the piece fits into the world of our
thoughts and feelings." It is in the musical language game that the music goes
out to human life, which knowledge, feelings, interpersonal relationships and
art are part of. Thus, music and emotions meet in language in the rich
Wittgensteinian sense of a form of life. And even more than that, the theme
itself "is a new part of our language," and thus a new part of our world. Music is
a constitutive component of human life, of human language games; it is part of
our emotive concepts from the start. With any new composition or new style
that we become acquainted with, we enlarge the borders of our world.
Wittgenstein's philosophy of music, like his philosophy in general, is not
presented in systematic arguments. Rather, concise, deep remarks, in many
cases enigmatic ones, are scattered all through his writings. These remarks call
for an interpretation. Presumably, it is better first to become acquainted with
Wittgenstein's meaning theory and special method of writing before trying to
decode his deep insights into music. Analyzing and confronting different
presentations of Wittgenstein's philosophy of music, in the form of a critical
study, would surely teach us a lot.[21] An acquaintance with other philosophical
attitudes that attempt to explain meaning in music would help as well.
However, I would like to say that the clue to understanding Wittgenstein's
philosophy of music is, more than anything else, music itself. His insights in the
matter make it evident, especially to the musician, that Wittgenstein has an
intimate, immediate access to Western music. It is doubtful whether one can
understand what he says about music without having significant musical skills.
In this essay I tried to demonstrate this claim by creating a little language
game and simultaneously contemplating it from the outside. I used the findings
of my musicological research and the way I introduce it to the reader as raw
material to show that music itself - in this case Haydn's instrumental music -
tells us no less, and perhaps even more, about the understanding of music,
than philosophers of music do.
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Lewis mentions this point as well, but he concentrates on Wittgenstein's concept
of "experiencing the meaning of a word" and in its importance for explanations
of understanding poetry and music. Hanfling discusses the meaning of emotive
descriptions of music. He uses Wittgenstein's concept of "secondary sense" to
explain this, connecting the issue with the notion of experiencing the meaning
of a word. Joanna Hodge, in "Aesthetic Decomposition: Music, Identity, and
Time," in The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays, ed. Michael Krausz
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 247-258, places Wittgenstein's
explanation of understanding music in a broader aesthetic frame, according to
which the temporal dimension of music is central in its importance for human
life. Understanding music, she claims, can be explained in terms of an internal
system that is depends on a specific historical style and its conventions.
[10] Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, pp. 6, 8, 19-21,
29, 32 and 34.
[11] Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Book: Preliminary Studies for
the 'Philosophical Investigations', 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), p. 167.
[12] Among the philosophers I have cited, Hanfling, in " 'I heard a plaintive
melody' (Philosophical Investigations, p. 209)," pp. 130-132, is the only one
who understands the analogy differently. As mentioned above, he claims that
emotive terms in descriptions of music are used with a secondary meaning.
Thus, understanding such terms is special; it is similar to understanding music.
This sort of understanding has a significant role in understanding language,
says Hanfling, and he quotes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,§
531: "We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be
replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it
cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be
replaced by another.)" In this sense of understanding, understanding a
linguistic sentence might be akin to understanding a sentence in music.
[13] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, 2nd ed., ed. Gertrude E. M. Anscombe and
Georg H. Von Wright, tr. Gertrude E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1981),§175.
[14] Worth and Lewis, who quote the well-known paragraph from the Brown
Book, infer different sorts of formalism from it. However, both show a
sensibility, in one way or another, to its apparent disharmony with things
Wittgenstein says on other occasions. Worth, in "Wittgenstein's Musical
Understanding," pp. 158-159, states, "Music is often seen as being problematic
because of its lack of detectable meaning, but this is precisely why Wittgenstein
thinks it has an advantage. The necessarily abstract quality of music allows us
to avoid being absorbed merely with the quest for referential meaning." But
later on she quotes an idea from Wittgenstein's Culture and Value, which is
very close to§ 175 of Zettel. Without explicitly discussing the contradiction, she
says (the emphasis is mine): "Here the music does go beyond the notes on the
page, but it does not refer to anything in the way that language does.
Though music contains meaning without being ostensive, it still seems to point
something beyond itself" (ibid., pp. 164-165).
Does the analogy collapse here? It seems that Worth is returning to a picture of
meaning that separates language from the world. She thus misses the point of
the well-known Wittgensteinian analogy, under the interpretation she herself
adopts. In any case Worth does not explain how music goes beyond itself
according to Wittgenstein, saying only that though an emotional reaction is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for understanding music, it often
accompanies such an understanding (ibid.). Lewis, in "Wittgenstein On Words
and Music," p. 119, offers an internalist interpretation of Wittgenstein:
"Understanding a musical theme will consist in grasping the interrelations
between or amongst its 'parts,' in appreciating the contribution of each to the
whole." In the conclusion of his essay he also quotes§ 175 of Zettel, and
explicitly points out the contradiction between the two different emphases. The
sense of "pointing outside itself" in Zettel is different from that in the Brown
Book, he says in the last paragraph of his essay: "The sense in Zettel could be
captured, I think, by saying that understanding a musical theme overlaps with
or is not isolated from other aspects of human life" (Ibid., p. 120). This notion,
which is only briefly mentioned in Lewis' essay, is, in my opinion, the heart of
Wittgenstein's philosophy of music, as we shall see.
[15] Webster and Bonds claim that the metaphor of rhetoric, in the broader
sense of coherence, discourse and intelligibility (in contrast to the narrow sense
of figures and the structure of the discourse), is important for understanding
classical style.
[16] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 2nd ed., ed. Georg H. Von Wright
and Heikki Nyman, tr. Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 69e.
[17] Ibid., p. 70e.
[18] Ibid., p. 52e.
[19] Of the scholars I have mentioned, Worth, in "Wittgenstein's Musical
Understanding," is the only one who quotes these words, but I'm afraid she
does not touch their essence. From what she says it seems that Wittgenstein is
trying to show here that it is useless to attempt to explain why the music
demands a repetition, for example. "What sounds 'right' is determined by its
creator, and confirmed and recognized by the understanding listener," she says
(ibid., p. 165). Worth mentions the link between music and the extra-musical
world. She states (the emphasis is mine): "Wittgenstein says that there is no
paradigm apart from the theme, but separately from that there are also the
rhythms of our language (of music) and of our thinking and feeling. All of
these have to be present for the composer and they are simultaneously
separate from the music and intimately related to produce a work that sounds
coherent" (ibid., pp. 165-166). Worth does not point out the rich contradiction,
the fascinating split, that Wittgenstein intentionally reveals here, in his original
way, through an indirect question. In that way she misses the point and
remains with the picture of a gap.
[20] Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 57e; compare with Wittgenstein,
Zettel,§175.
[21] A sort of a critical study, mostly in clues, I intentionally demonstrated in
the footnotes.
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